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PRESERVING RIGHTS OR PERPETUATING CHAOS: AN
ANALYSIS OF OHIO’S PRIVATE CHALLENGERS OF
VOTERS ACT AND THE SIXTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN
SUMMIT COUNTY DEMOCRATIC CENTRAL AND
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE V. BLACKWELL
By Dale Smith *

I. INTRODUCTION
With the seventh highest population among the fifty states, Ohio
plays a critical role in presidential elections. 1 In fact, no Republican
presidential candidate has ever made it to the White House without
winning Ohio. 2 Furthermore, only two Democrats since 1900 have won
a presidential election without taking the Buckeye State. 3 Political
experts believe Ohio is a microcosm of the country because issues of
great importance to Ohioans typically reflect those important to the rest
of the country. Additionally, Ohio cannot be classified as either urban
or rural. Ohio has twenty-seven counties with populations over 100,000,
yet nearly two million of its residents are involved in the agricultural
industry. 4 Like many other states, the recent economic recession has
significantly impacted Ohio through job losses in the manufacturing
sector.
In the months preceding the 2004 election, both President George W.
Bush and Senator John Kerry recognized the weight Ohio would carry in
the presidential race. By the end of July, President Bush had already
visited six times and sent more than 50,000 volunteers to Ohio. 5 Four of
the top five media markets targeted by the presidential campaigns were

* Associate Member, 2005–2006 University of Cincinnati Law Review.
1. See U.S. Census Bureau home page, http://www.census.gov/popest/states/tables/NSTEST2004-01.xls (last visited Sep. 20, 2005). Ohio’s Resident population as of July 1, 2004, was
11,459,011. Id. The presidential candidate that wins the popular vote in Ohio receives twenty electoral
votes. See Federal Election Commission home page, http://www.fec.gov/pages/elecvote.htm (last
visited Sep. 20, 2005).
2. James Taranto, With Trends Like These . . . , WALL ST. J., July 27, 2004, at A16.
3. Case Western Reserve University, All Eyes on Ohio: Experts from Case Explain Why
Winning the Buckeye State is Essential for the 2004 Presidential Candidates (Aug. 3, 2004),
http://www.case.edu/news/2004/8-04/why_ohio.htm (“Since first casting a ballot for President in 1804,
Ohioans have voted with the winning candidate 82% of the time.”).
4. Id.
5. Id.
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cities in Ohio and more political advertisements were purchased in Ohio
than any other state except Florida. 6 Given the national recognition of
Ohio as a bellwether state and the result of Florida’s popular vote in the
2000 election, where President Bush defeated Al Gore by a mere 537
votes, 7 each political party acknowledged the importance of registering
new voters who would support its candidate. Additionally, both parties
understood the significance of preventing ineligible voters from casting
their votes for the other party.
The importance of these issues in the 2004 presidential election was
prevalent throughout Ohio, particularly in the Cincinnati area. Between
January 2004 and the November election, approximately 84,000 new
voters were registered in Hamilton County alone. 8 Leaders from the
Republican Party recognized that a majority of new voters would be
supporting John Kerry, and in the weeks preceding the election, they
compiled a list of 35,000 registered Democrats suspected to be ineligible
to vote. 9 Under Ohio law, political parties are permitted to designate
challengers at each precinct to challenge voters’ eligibility. 10
On October 20, 2004, Secretary of State Kenneth Blackwell issued a
memorandum to all county boards of elections containing guidelines for
implementing Ohio’s voter challenger law. 11 Blackwell issued the
memorandum because the statute does not specify the procedures and
limitations for challenging voters. 12
The memo instructed that
challengers could challenge voters only for good cause, and if a
challenger unnecessarily delayed the voting process or intimidated
voters, the presiding judge of the precinct was to take immediate
action. 13 The memo also instructed that once a voter was challenged,
the presiding judge was to administer form 10-U, 14 which requires the
voter to swear under oath that he or she will truthfully answer the
6. Id.
7. See Lance deHaven-Smith, Clearing Up the Election That Won’t Die, TALLAHASSEE
DEMOCRAT, Sep. 2, 2002.
8. Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 535 (S.D. Ohio 2004).
9. Jordan Green, Cincinnati Takes on Jim Crow-Era Voter Challenger Law, S. EXPOSURE, Nov.
9, 2004, available at http://www.southernstudies.org/reports/OhioProvisionals.pdf (last visited Sep. 20,
2005). This list was compiled by mailing cards to newly registered voters and marking the pieces of
mail returned because the address was wrong. Id.
10. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.21 (West 2005). This statute will be discussed in further
detail in Part II.
11. See Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 531. This law is codified as section 3505.20 of the Ohio
Revised Code. This statute will be discussed in Part II.
12. See Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
13. Id.
14. Form 10-U is an affidavit the challenged voter is required to sign to maintain his or her
eligibility.
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questions regarding his or her eligibility to vote and then sign an
affidavit under penalty of a fifth-degree felony for election
falsification. 15
Two days after Blackwell issued the memorandum, the Hamilton
County Republican Party filed for hundreds of challengers to be
physically present in the polling places in order to challenge the
eligibility of voters. 16 In previous elections, precinct executives that
served as challengers for political parties in Hamilton County had not
actually come to polling places or participated in eligibility challenges. 17
Furthermore, the Republican Party filed for 251 challengers in addition
to the precinct executive challengers. 18 Tim Burke, chairman of the
Hamilton County Board of Elections, testified that two-thirds of the
additional Republican challengers filed to be present at predominantly
African-American precincts. 19
In response to the Republican Party’s plan to send hundreds of
challengers to predominantly African-American precincts, a lawsuit was
filed on October 27, 2004, against Blackwell, the Hamilton County
Board of Elections, and the chair and individual members of that
board. 20 The plaintiffs in this case were Marian and Donald Spencer, a
couple residing in a predominantly African-American neighborhood in
Cincinnati. 21 The Spencers sought to enjoin the defendants from
allowing any challengers other than election judges and other electors
into the polling places on Election Day, alleging that the defendants had
“combined to implement a voter challenge system at the polls on
Election Day that discriminates against African-American voters.” 22
Around the time the Spencers filed in the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio, the Summit County Democratic Central and
Executive Committee initiated a similar suit in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Ohio. 23 This suit alleged that enforcement
15. Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 531.
16. Id. at 530.
17. Id.
18. Id. Hamilton County estimated that 629 Republican challengers would be present at polling
places on Election Day. Id. at 530 n.3.
19. Id. Evidence shown at the district court hearing for Spencer showed that only fourteen
percent of new voters in majority white polling places would face a Republican party challenger, while
ninety-seven percent of new voters in predominantly African-American voting locations would see a
challenger. Id.
20. See id. at 529.
21. Id. Marian Spencer estimated that one hundred percent of the voters in her precinct (ward
13, precinct H) were African-American. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell (Summit County II),
388 F.3d 547, 549 (6th Cir. 2004).
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of the voter challenger law deprived Ohio citizens of their constitutional
rights to due process and equal protection. 24
On October 29, the Secretary of State issued a statement
recommending the removal of challengers from polling places to
Attorney General Jim Petro. 25 While Blackwell did not address the
constitutionality of the voter challenger statute, he believed “a full airing
of the issues [could not] be completed prior to Tuesday’s election.” 26
Despite this recommendation, Petro refused to exclude challengers from
polling places on Election Day. 27 He based his decision on his duty as
attorney general to defend Ohio’s laws, and he stated that Ohio citizens
would have the right to challenge voters at polling places until the law
was declared unconstitutional. 28
On October 31, the Northern District of Ohio court granted a motion
for a temporary restraining order, stipulating that “persons appointed as
challengers may not be present at the polling place for the sole purpose
of challenging the qualifications of other voters” on Election Day. 29
The next day, the Southern District of Ohio court granted a similar
motion in Spencer v. Blackwell. 30 The motions granted in each case
were immediately appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit consolidated the appeals. Around midnight on
November 2, Election Day, the Sixth Circuit overturned both decisions,
allowing challengers to be present at polling places. 31
This Comment advocates for a new standard in Ohio regarding the
right of appointed parties and private individuals to challenge the
eligibility of voters at polling places. Based on the United States
Constitution, federal statutes, and prior case law, the Sixth Circuit’s
decision was incorrect. The Ohio regulations are not narrowly tailored
to protect the compelling interest of protecting voters from intimidation
at the polls. Part II of this Comment presents the federal and state law
surrounding the issue. Part III analyzes the opinions from the two
federal district court cases and the Sixth Circuit case that was decided
the morning of the November election. Part IV examines statutes from
other states that regulate voter challenges at polling places. This Part

24. Id.
25. See Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 532.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell (Summit County I), No.
5:04CV2165, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22539, at *27.
30. Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 538.
31. See Green, supra note 9.
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also explains why the Ohio statute conflicts with federal law and is
unconstitutional and why the Sixth Circuit’s holding in Summit County
Democratic and Central Committee v. Blackwell was erroneous. Part V
discusses the impact the Sixth Circuit’s opinion had on the November
election and recommends changes the Ohio legislature should make to
comply with federal law.
II. ELECTION LAW
In order to analyze the validity of the Ohio challenger statutes and the
Sixth Circuit’s opinion, an understanding of the existing legislation and
case law governing the matter is necessary. This Part examines
constitutional amendments, federal statutes, federal case law, and the
relevant Ohio statutes to provide a framework for analysis.
A. U.S. Constitutional Amendments
The Fifteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
the right to vote and prevents infringement of that right by the States on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. 32 Section two
of the Amendment gives Congress the power to enforce this right
through appropriate legislation. 33 The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
States from denying to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws. 34
B. Federal Statutory Law
Pursuant to section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution, Congress enacted the Help America Vote Act of 2002
(HAVA). 35 This act was passed in response to the problems that
occurred in the 2000 presidential election. 36 This Comment is
particularly concerned with section 15482 of HAVA, which addresses

32. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
33. Id. § 2.
34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
35. See Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2004).
36. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Civil Rights Division, Voting Section home page,
http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/hava/hava.html (last visited Sep. 20, 2005). The legislative aims of
HAVA are: “(1) creating a new federal agency to serve as a clearinghouse for election administration
information; (2) providing funds to states to improve election administration and replace outdated voting
systems; and (3) creating minimum standards for states to follow in several key areas of election
administration.” Id.
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provisional voting and voting information requirements. 37 According to
this section, if an individual claims to be a registered voter and eligible
to vote in an election for federal office in the jurisdiction where he
desires to vote, but his name does not appear on the list of eligible
voters, he must be permitted to cast a provisional ballot. 38 The presiding
election official at that polling place must notify the individual of this
right, and the individual must execute a written affirmation declaring his
eligibility. 39 This section of HAVA also requires the election official to
promptly verify provisional ballots and provide information to the
individual filing the ballot that enables the voter to find out whether or
not his vote was counted and, if it was not counted, the reason behind
this decision. 40
C. Federal Case Law
In addition to the federal statutory law on point, a great deal of
precedent has been handed down from the United States Supreme Court
governing the disenfranchisement of voters and the abridgement of
fundamental rights in general. The ratification of the Fifteenth
Amendment in 1870 prohibited the states from disenfranchising
individuals on the basis of race. 41 In Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court
held that “[a] citizen’s right to vote free of arbitrary impairment by state
action has been judicially recognized as a right secured by the
Constitution . . .” 42 In Yick Wo v. Hopkins the Court referred to “the
political franchise of voting” as a “fundamental political right, because it
is preservative of all rights.” 43 The Supreme Court has also declared:
The right of suffrage is a fundamental matter in a free and democratic
society. Especially since the right to exercise the franchise in a free and
unimpaired manner is preservative of other basic civil and political rights,
any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be carefully
and meticulously scrutinized. 44

37. 42 U.S.C. § 15482.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 15482(a).
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
42. 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962). In Baker, a group of Tennessee citizens challenged a state statute
that allegedly appointed state representatives without reference to any logical formula. The Court
reversed the lower court’s dismissal, holding that the complaint’s allegations of a denial of equal
protection presented a justiciable constitutional cause of action upon which plaintiffs were entitled to a
trial and a decision. Id.
43. 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
44. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561–62 (1964). In this case the plaintiffs alleged that,
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The Court in Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections held that
where fundamental rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal
Protection Clause, classifications that might invade or restrain them
must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined. 45 The Court also
held that the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
restrains the states from enacting voter qualifications that invidiously
discriminate. 46
Recent Supreme Court decisions have also reinforced the fundamental
nature of the right to vote. In Burson v. Freeman, the Court held that
allowing vote solicitation near the polls would cause voter
intimidation. 47 The Supreme Court has also recognized that, “as a
practical matter, there must be a substantial regulation of elections if
they are to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than
chaos, is to accompany the democratic process.” 48 In Bush v. Gore, the
Court stated that the individual citizen has no federal constitutional right
to vote for electors of the president, but once a state legislature vests the
right to vote for the president in its people, that right is fundamental. 49
The Court further held that, having once granted the right to vote on
equal terms, the state may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment,
value one person’s vote over that of another. 50 The opinion declared
that equal protection of the law applies to the manner in which a law is
exercised. 51 The Court also stated that, where state officials confer
authority on local election officials, the state may have a greater burden

despite uneven population growth from 1900 to 1960, the failure of the Alabama legislature to
reapportion itself denied them equal suffrage in free and equal elections and the equal protection of the
law, in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 541.
45. 383 U.S. 663, 670 (1966). In Harper, residents of Virginia filed an action against the voting
officials, seeking a declaration that a poll tax was unconstitutional as a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Id.
46. Id. at 666.
47. 504 U.S. 191, 206 (1992). Here the Court held that, because activity, even in a public forum,
may interfere with other important activities for which the property is used, the government may
regulate the time, place, and manner of the expressive activity, so long as such restrictions are content
neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample
alternatives for communication. Id. at 197.
48. Timmons v. Twin Cities Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351, 358 (1997) (quoting Storer v.
Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974)). In this case, the Court also held that if an election regulation
imposes a severe burden, the regulation must be narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. Id.
49. 531 U.S. 98, 104 (2000). Bush v. Gore examined whether the recount procedures adopted by
the lower court were consistent with its obligation to avoid arbitrary and disparate treatment of the
members of its electorate. In a per curiam opinion, the Court concluded that the lower court’s decision
violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because the lower court failed to
identify and require standards for accepting or rejecting contested ballots. Id.
50. Id. at 104–05.
51. Id. at 104.
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to ensure the equal application of its laws to voters. 52 This case suggests
that deprivations of voters’ rights because of administrative
malfeasance, disregard of the rules, or failure to apply the rules equally
to all voters is against the law. 53
The Supreme Court set forth a test for district courts to use when
deciding constitutional challenges to specific provisions of a state’s
election law in Anderson v. Celebrezze. 54 A district court must first
consider the character and magnitude of the asserted injury to the rights
protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments that the plaintiff
seeks to vindicate. 55 It must then identify and evaluate the precise
interests put forward by the state as justification for the burden imposed
by its law. 56 The court must not only determine the strength of the
state’s interest, but also the extent to which those interests make it
necessary to burden the voters’ rights. 57 After balancing all of these
factors, a court must then determine whether the challenged provision is
constitutional. 58
D. Ohio Law
Based on the text of HAVA, the Fourteenth and Fifteenth
Amendments of the United States Constitution, and the Supreme Court
decisions that interpret those amendments, any state attempting to
challenge the eligibility of its voters must be precise in both statutory
language and application. This section examines the language of the
Ohio statutes applicable to determine whether they comply with federal
guidelines.
Section 3505.20 of the Ohio Revised Code (Voter Challenger Statute)
declares that any person attempting to vote at a polling place may have
his or her eligibility challenged by any challenger, any elector then
lawfully in the polling place, or any judge or clerk of elections. 59 If a
voter is challenged, the presiding judge administers an oath to the voter,

52. Id. at 109.
53. See Barry H. Weinberg & Lyn Utrecht, Problems in America’s Polling Places: How Can
They Be Stopped, 11 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 401, 434–35 (2002).
54. 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983). In this case, an independent candidate in the presidential election
challenged an Ohio statute the preventing independent candidates from declaring their eligibility after a
certain date. The Court set forth the standard for determining the constitutionality of statutes regulating
the election process. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.20 (West 2005).
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and the election judges then ask that individual a series of questions
depending on the basis for the challenge. 60 The statute further requires
that the presiding judge shall put forth such other questions to the
challenged party as necessary to test that potential voter’s
qualifications. 61 If the person challenged refuses to answer any
question, is unable to answer a question, or refuses to sign his or her
name, or if for any other reason a majority of the judges believes the
person is not entitled to vote, the judges shall refuse the person a
ballot. 62
Section 3505.21 of the Ohio Revised Code (Appointment of
Challengers Statute) governs the appointment of challengers at polling
places. 63 This statute allows any political party supporting candidates to
be voted upon at that election and any group of five or more candidates
to appoint challengers at polling places. 64 This section requires political
parties appointing challengers to notify the board of elections of the
names and addresses of its appointees and the polling places at which
they shall serve not less than eleven days before the election. 65 The
statute requires individuals appointed as challengers to take an oath that
they will not cause undue delay and will not disclose how any elector
has voted in that election. 66
Section 3505.22 of the Ohio Revised Code (Impersonating Voter
Statute) bestows upon any precinct officer, challenger, or other elector
the ability to question the right to vote of another individual if the
questioning party believes that individual is impersonating an elector. 67
If, in the opinion of a majority of the precinct officers, the signature is
not that of the person who signed such name in the registration forms,
then such person may be refused a ballot. 68 The individual who is

60. Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 530 (S.D. Ohio 2004). Section 3505.20 of the
Ohio Revised Code instructs that a person may be challenged on the grounds that (1) he or she is not a
citizen, (2) he or she has not resided in Ohio for thirty days immediately preceding the election, (3) he or
she is not a resident of the county or precinct where he or she has arrived to vote, or (4) he or she is not
of legal voting age.
61. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.20.
62. Id.
63. Id. § 3505.21.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. The oath is as follows: “You do solemnly swear that you will faithfully and impartially
discharge the duties as an official challenger and witness, assigned by law; that you will not cause any
delay to persons offering to vote, further than is necessary to procure satisfactory information of their
qualification as electors; and that you will not disclose or communicate to any person how any elector
has voted at such election.” Id.
67. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.22.
68. Id.
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refused a ballot may appeal that decision immediately to the board of
elections. 69
III. SPENCER AND SUMMIT COUNTY
This Part analyzes the opinions of the two district court cases ordering
preliminary injunctions to prevent challengers from being present at
polling places. It then examines the Sixth Circuit ruling handed down
the morning of Election Day that reversed the district courts’ decisions
and allowed for implementation of the Voter Challenger Statute.
A. District Court Holdings
Judge Susan J. Dlott of the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Ohio based her decision in Spencer on an analysis of the four
factors considered in determining the appropriateness of a preliminary
injunction. 70 When examining the likelihood of success on the merits,
the court acknowledged that the polling places faced an extraordinary
and potentially disastrous risk of intimidation and delay based on the
number of newly registered voters and the presence of inexperienced
challengers. 71 The court determined that this delay and intimidation
could severely burden the right to vote, and that prevention of
intimidation was a compelling state interest. 72 It then considered
whether the regulation imposed by the Voter Challenger Statute was
narrowly tailored to serve this purpose. 73 The court concluded that the
challengers at polling places had the same purpose as the election
judges, and because election judges are knowledgeable and experienced
in identifying potentially ineligible voters, a law allowing the disruption
of the system by individuals with no experience in the process is not
narrowly tailored.
The court discussed the additional factors considered when deciding a
motion for a preliminary injunction. However, it primarily based its
decision on the plaintiffs’ showing of substantial likelihood of success

69. Id.
70. Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 533 (S.D. Ohio 2004). Pursuant to Leary v.
Daeschner, 228 F.3d 729, 736 (6th Cir. 2000), the court considers the following factors: “(1) whether
the movant has a ‘strong’ likelihood of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant would otherwise
suffer irreparable injury; (3) whether issuance of a preliminary injunction would cause substantial harm
to others; and (4) whether the public would be served by issuance of a preliminary injunction.”
71. Spencer, 347 F. Supp. 2d at 535.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 536–37.
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on the merits on the ground that allowing challengers at polling places is
unconstitutional. 74
Judge John R. Adams of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio advanced similar justifications when deciding the
Summit County case. However, the Northern District opinion contained
an in-depth analysis to determine whether the standing requirement was
met. 75 The court decided that, because individual voters were named as
plaintiffs, and because voters faced an imminent and particularized risk
of the deprivation of their constitutionally protected equal protection and
due process rights, the plaintiffs had the requisite standing to pursue the
claim. 76
When analyzing the factors for a preliminary injunction, the court
recognized that preventing election fraud is a compelling state interest,
but it determined that the Voter Challenger Statute was not narrowly
tailored to serve that interest. 77 The court reasoned that because election
judges already have the power to challenge potential voters and because
Ohio has a process for handling voter challenges prior to Election Day,78
no additional challengers were necessary at polling places. 79
The court went on to recognize that voters have a fundamental right to
participate in elections, but that no fundamental right to challenge other
voters exists. 80 It held that if challengers were permitted at polling
places significant harm was substantially likely to occur not only to
voters, but also to the voting process as a whole. 81 The court speculated
that random challenges without cause by one political party could result
in retaliatory challenges by the other party, giving rise to chaos and a
level of voter frustration that would turn qualified electors away from
the polls. 82
B. Sixth Circuit Holding
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit consolidated the
appeals for the two district court cases and issued one ruling regarding

74. Id. at 537.
75. Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell (Summit County I), No.
5:04CV2165, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22539, at **10–15 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2004).
76. Id. at *15.
77. Id. at **20–21.
78. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.19 (West 2005).
79. Summit County I, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22539, at *21.
80. Id. at *22.
81. Id. at *24.
82. Id. at *25.
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the motion for an emergency stay of the district court orders. 83 A threejudge panel consisting of Judges John Rogers, James Ryan, and R. Guy
Cole, Jr. heard the appeal. 84 In a 2-1 decision, the panel stayed the two
district court orders. 85 The panel issued three separate opinions. 86 This
section examines each opinion.
When addressing the standing requirement, Judge Rogers determined
that there was a nonspeculative possibility that voters would face delay
and inconvenience when voting. 87 Based on this possibility, he held that
the plaintiffs had met the standing requirement. 88 However, when
examining the merits of the claim, Judge Rogers concluded that the
possibility of longer lines and confusion at polling places did not amount
to the severe burden upon the right to vote that required the statute to be
declared unconstitutional. 89 This opinion also held that the policy
considerations in favor of allowing registered voters to vote freely did
not outweigh either the state’s right to prevent ineligible voters from
casting ballots or the public interest in the smooth and effective
administration of voting laws. 90 Based on these considerations, he
granted the motion to stay the district court orders.91
The concurring opinion of Judge Ryan reasoned that the motion
should be stayed because the plaintiffs did not show that they had met
the standing requirement. 92
This opinion stated that the Voter
Challenger Statute had been on the books in Ohio for decades, and the
problems of voter intimidation, chaos, confusion, and inordinate delay
had never occurred in previous elections. 93
In his dissent Judge R. Guy Cole, Jr. reasoned that because the State
has other measures in place to prevent voter fraud at the polls balancing
the competing interests in a vacuum was improper. 94 This opinion also
recognized the plans of Republican challengers to target precincts with
predominantly African-American voters without any legal restrictions

83. See Summit County Democratic Cent. and Executive Comm. v. Blackwell (Summit County
II), 388 F.3d 547 (6th Cir. 2004).
84. See Edward B. Foley, Sixth Circuit Opinions in Polling Place Challenges Cases: A
Preliminary Analysis (Nov. 2, 2004), http://moritzlaw.osu.edu/electionlaw/analysis/041102a.html.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Summit County II, 388 F.3d at 550.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 551.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. (Ryan, J., concurring).
93. Id. at 552.
94. Id. (Cole, J., dissenting).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol74/iss2/10

12

Smith: PRESERVING RIGHTS OR PERPETUATING CHAOS: AN ANALYSIS OF OHIO’S PR

2005]

PRIVATE CHALLENGERS OF VOTERS

731

and maintained that the court should have erred on the side of protecting
those exercising the right to vote. 95
Judge Cole referred to the evidence cited by the district courts
supporting the conclusion that permitting voter challenges could lead to
suppression, intimidation, and chaos at polls. 96 He then illustrated his
concern with the following hypothetical situation. Hundreds of
Republican lawyers arrive at polling places to challenge voters followed
by hundreds of Democratic lawyers to challenge those challenges, a
situation he described as a “recipe for confusion and chaos.” 97 Judge
Cole also argued, “voter intimidation is likely [here] because the
partisan operatives at the polls will be challenging the right to vote itself,
rather than merely campaigning for a particular candidate or issue.”98
He concluded by stating that the citizens of Ohio should have the right
to vote without threat of suppression, intimidation, or chaos created by
partisan politics. 99
IV. DISCUSSION
This Part surveys a sample of laws from other states and analyzes the
procedural safeguards that are in place to ensure that the rights of the
voter are not infringed upon. It then examines the inherent conflicts
between the Voter Challenger Statute in Ohio and federal law discussed
in Part II. Finally, this Part discusses the flaws in the reasoning of the
Sixth Circuit’s ruling and argues that the outcome should have been
different.
A. Statutes from Other Jurisdictions Regulating the Right to Challenge
Voters
This section examines statutes from a sample of states and compares
these statutes to Ohio’s law regarding voter challenges and the right of
voters to cast provisional ballots. The section concludes that the Ohio
statutory provisions do not provide adequate safeguards to prevent
foreseeable problems from occurring at polling places.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 553. In Spencer, Judge Dlott of the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio heard testimony of challengers displaying an incomplete or confused understanding of the proper
election procedures, relevant statistics as to the racial population of certain counties that were targeted,
and the lack of guidelines regarding how to deal with challenges—and found that this was likely to lead
to voter intimidation. Id.
97. Id. at 554.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 555.
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Arizona law permits the county chairman of each political party to
designate a party representative for each polling place to act as a
challenger. When the eligibility of a voter is challenged, election
officials determine whether the challenged party is registered in that
precinct. 100 If it appears that the challenged person is registered, the
officials will then ask the person to take an oath declaring his eligibility
to vote and ask the person questions material to the challenge. 101 If the
person challenged refuses to be sworn or affirmed, or refuses to answer
questions material to the challenge, the person is still entitled to cast a
provisional ballot. 102
The validity of this provisional ballot is
determined at a later date. 103 Unlike Ohio’s statute, Arizona’s law
allows any voter to fill out a provisional ballot, even if the elector
refuses to take an oath declaring his eligibility.
In California, only a member of that precinct’s board of elections may
challenge a voter. 104 California law also requires that voter challenges
only be made under certain circumstances set forth in the statute. 105 In
addition to the statute regulating voter challenges, California has another
statute stating, “Any doubt in the interpretation of the law shall be
resolved in favor of the challenged voter.” 106 Unlike the Ohio statute,
which permits challenges from any eligible voter, California law
requires that voter challenges come directly from precinct officials. This
ensures that the party making the challenge is familiar with the
guidelines of voter challenges. The California statute also categorizes
grounds for challenging a vote, unlike the laws in Ohio and other
jurisdictions that allow a party to challenge for “good cause,” but
provide no guidelines. California also ensures that any ambiguity in the
enforcement of the law will not act to disenfranchise the voter. Ohio has
no such law protecting voters from ambiguous interpretations of the law.
Georgia law allows any voter to challenge the eligibility of any other
voter whose name appears on the list of electors. 107 However, this law
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 16-592 (2001).
Id.
Id.
Id. § 16-584.
CAL. ELEC. CODE § 14240 (West 2004).
See id. The challenge can only be made if the board member has reason to believe:

(1) That the voter is not the person whose name appears on the list of voters. (2) That the
voter is not a resident of the precinct. (3) That the voter is not a citizen of the United
States. (4) That the voter has voted that day. (5) That the voter is presently on parole for
conviction of a felony.
Id.
106. Id. § 14251.
107. GA. CODE ANN. § 21-2-230 (2005).

https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol74/iss2/10

14

Smith: PRESERVING RIGHTS OR PERPETUATING CHAOS: AN ANALYSIS OF OHIO’S PR

2005]

PRIVATE CHALLENGERS OF VOTERS

733

requires that the challenge be made in writing and distinctly specify the
grounds for the challenge. 108 Upon the filing of a challenge, the board
of registrars meets immediately to determine whether probable cause
exists to sustain a challenge. 109 If the registrars find probable cause, the
challenged party has a right to answer the challenge at that time, or cast
an absentee ballot and wait for a hearing to determine the validity of his
vote. 110 At this hearing, the challenging party still has the burden of
proving that the voter is not eligible. 111 Either side can appeal the
decision made by the registrars at this hearing to the superior court. 112
While Georgia law does not place limitations on the source of the voter
challenge, it is the only state examined that requires voter challenges be
reduced to writing. This helps ensure that challenges will not be made
arbitrarily because the challenger must also state adequate grounds for
the challenge. Unlike Ohio, Georgia law guarantees the challenged
voter’s right to cast a provisional ballot while the challenge is pending.
Georgia also offers an appellate process to voters whose right is initially
denied.
Illinois law permits election judges, pollwatchers, or any eligible
voter to challenge the status of any other voter. 113 If the challenge is
sustained by a majority of the election judges, then the voter challenged
still has the opportunity to cast a provisional ballot, so long as the
challenged party signs an affidavit affirming his eligibility to vote. 114 A
person casting a provisional ballot may ascertain whether the provisional
vote was counted and, if not counted, the reason it was not counted. 115
Illinois law gives local election boards the authority to design its own
provisional voting verification system, but stipulates that the system
must be in compliance with HAVA. 116 The Illinois regulations for voter
challenges are similar to the laws in Ohio. However, the Illinois law on
provisional voting verification systems strictly complies with the
requirements of HAVA, and therefore does not attempt to supercede
federal law. This is an example of the minimum protections a state must
provide in order to comply with federal law.
South Carolina law permits voter challenges by watchers, electors, or

108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 23-2-229.
Id.
10 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/18A-5 (West 2004).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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managers, 117 but stipulates the circumstances for which a challenge can
be made. 118 Once a person is challenged, that person must insist they
are an eligible voter in order to receive a provisional ballot. 119 The voter
then fills out the provisional ballot, and the ballot will be placed in an
envelope and kept separate from the rest of the ballots. 120 If the
challenger cannot offer adequate evidence that the person is not eligible
to vote, the provisional ballot is taken out of its envelope and
commingled with the other ballots. 121 South Carolina law complies with
the HAVA provision entitling any person willing to take an oath
declaring his eligibility to vote to a provisional ballot. However, like the
Ohio and Georgia statutes, the South Carolina regulation places no
limitation the source of the challenge. A measure such as this ensures
that a voter will be allowed to cast a ballot but does not guarantee that
the voter will be free from undue delay.
In Texas, only persons admitted to vote and precinct election officials
are permitted to be within the polling place when the election is being
conducted. 122 Previously, Texas had a statute permitting election
officials, watchers, or other persons to challenge the eligibility of a
voter. 123 However, this act has since been repealed. 124 Every voter is
required to provide a statement of residence. 125 A voter may only be
challenged if that party refuses to submit a statement of residence or if
the voter’s name does not appear on a poll list. 126 However, any party
that is not permitted to vote is entitled to cast a provisional ballot if that
person executes an affidavit stating his eligibility to vote in that
precinct. 127 The Texas statute eliminates the possibility that challenges
will be arbitrarily applied by requiring every voter to submit a statement
declaring his residence. Even if a voter is unable or unwilling to declare
his residence he will be permitted to cast a provisional ballot, in
accordance with HAVA.

117. See Greene v. S.C. Election Comm’n, 445 S.E.2d 451 (S.C. 1994).
118. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 7-13-830 (2005). The vote can be challenged based on the person’s
right to vote in that precinct, qualifications to vote, or the absence of his or her name on the voter
registration list and the inability of the election commission to verify that the voter is registered to vote
in that precinct.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 61.001 (Vernon 2004).
123. See id. § 61.010.
124. Law of Sep. 1, 1997, Chs. 1078, 1349 (repealed Jan. 1, 2004).
125. § 63.0011.
126. See id. § 61.001.
127. Id. § 61.011.
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In Virginia, any qualified voter may challenge the vote of any person
who is listed on the pollbook but is known or suspected not to be a
qualified voter. 128 If the challenged person insists that he or she is a
qualified voter and the challenge is not withdrawn, one of the election
officers shall give the voter a form containing a sworn statement for that
person to sign. 129 So long as the challenged person signs the statement,
he or she will be permitted to vote on the voting system used at that
precinct. 130 The Virginia statute, like the Illinois statute, places no
limitation on which party may challenge the voter. However unlike the
Ohio statute, Virginia and Illinois guarantee that any person who takes
an oath declaring his eligibility cannot be entirely disenfranchised.
Examining these various regulations shows that many states value the
rights of third parties to challenge the eligibility of voters. However,
every state examined provides at least one procedural safeguard that
Ohio does not offer for the protection of its voters. California and Texas
require voter challenges to come from qualified election officials. These
two states also categorize the grounds for which a challenge can be
sustained, rather than allowing challenges “for cause.” In Georgia,
Illinois, South Carolina, and Virginia a voter cannot be unconditionally
denied the right to cast a provisional ballot under any circumstances.
This strictly complies with the HAVA provision that Ohio has chosen to
ignore. These states also guarantee that a voter will have the
opportunity to provide evidence supporting his eligibility before the
state declares his ballot invalid.
Of the statutes examined, Georgia was the only state that required the
challenge to be in writing. This measure forces a challenger to state the
grounds for the contest, protecting voters from arbitrary challenges. The
Georgia statute also provided the most extensive appeals process of the
states from the sample. California, by passing a law that resolves any
doubt in favor of the voter, recognizes that voting is a fundamental right
and that voters should not be disenfranchised in the event of ambiguity.
B. Conflict Between Ohio Law and Federal Authority
As discussed in Part II, the Fifteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution prevents states from infringing on the right to vote on
account of race and gives Congress the power to enforce this right

128. VA. CODE ANN. § 24.2-651 (Michie 2004).
129. Id.
130. Id.
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through appropriate legislation. 131 Based on this right, Congress enacted
HAVA, which includes a section governing provisional voting
requirements. 132 This section requires that an individual who claims to
be an eligible voter must be permitted to cast a provisional ballot, even if
his name does not appear on a list of eligible voters for that precinct. 133
This section of HAVA also requires an election official to verify the
ballot and give the voter contact information to determine whether his
vote was counted. 134
Despite the precise and unambiguous language contained in this
section of HAVA, the Ohio Voter Challenger Statute permits judges at
polling places to refuse a ballot to a party “if for any other reason a
majority of the judges believes the person is not entitled to vote . . . .”135
The language of the Ohio statute unquestionably conflicts with, and is
thus superceded by, the relevant section of HAVA. Based on this facial
violation of a federal statute on point, this portion of the Voter
Challenger Statute should be declared invalid.
While certain provisions of the Voter Challenger Statute clearly
violate HAVA, no federal law on point prohibits challengers from being
present at polling places on Election Day. Therefore, it is necessary to
examine whether this statute is overreaching on its face and whether the
statute permits the implementation of the measure in a manner that
should be found unconstitutional. 136
Case law handed down from the Supreme Court has established that
the right to vote is fundamental, and that any alleged infringement of
that right must be carefully scrutinized. 137 Furthermore, Anderson v.
Celebrezze held that determining the constitutionality of an election law
requires a district court to balance the magnitude of the injury asserted
by the voter against the interest of the state and the extent to which the
burden is necessary to protect the state’s interest. 138 The next step in
determining whether the Ohio Voter Challenger Statute is constitutional
is to analyze whether the law is narrowly tailored to fit Ohio’s interest in
preventing election fraud.

131. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, §§ 1–2.
132. See Help America Vote Act of 2002, 42 U.S.C. §§ 15301–15545 (2004).
133. See id. § 15482(a).
134. Id.
135. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3505.20 (West 2005).
136. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (holding that equal protection of the law applies to the
manner in which the law is executed).
137. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
138. 460 U.S. 780, 789 (1983).
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Ohio law gives election judges the authority to challenge the
qualifications of voters on Election Day. 139 Furthermore, any qualified
elector may challenge the eligibility of any other voter at any time
during the year. 140 However, a challenge that takes place prior to
Election Day requires the challenger to state the ground upon which the
contest is made. 141 The presence of election officials at the polls and
ability to challenge the eligibility of voters before an election takes place
are evidence of other safeguards Ohio has in place to prevent voter
fraud. Based on these safeguards the statute is not narrowly tailored to
fit this interest.
The Ohio Voter Challenger Statute must also be analyzed to
determine whether its implementation violates the Constitution or
federal law. The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from denying
individuals equal protection of the laws. 142 The Fifteenth Amendment
prevents infringement by the states of the right to vote on account of
race. 143 In Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court held that a state may not
value one person’s vote over that of another. 144 This case also states
that failure to apply rules equally to all voters is unconstitutional. 145
The Ohio voter challenger law contains no requirement that
challenges take place in uniformity across county or precinct lines. This
characteristic is evidenced by testimony from the Spencer case that
established that two-thirds of the 251 additional challengers in Hamilton
County were to be stationed at predominantly African-American
precincts. 146 Based on this plan of implementation, the Ohio statutes
leave the door open for disparate treatment across racial lines, violating
the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. Furthermore, one could
argue that the longer lines caused by the presence of challengers at
polling places is an indication that the state values the votes of citizens
in certain precincts less than citizens in precincts where challengers are
not present. By limiting the source of challenges to election officials
only, Ohio could ensure that challenges are consistent across precinct
lines.

139. See Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell (Summit County I),
No. 5:04CV2165, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22539 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2004); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 3505.20 (West 2004).
140. § 3505.19.
141. Id.
142. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
143. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
144. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000).
145. Id.
146. Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 530 (S.D. Ohio 2004).
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C. The Flawed Reasoning of the Sixth Circuit
The ruling of the Sixth Circuit panel, which was released only hours
before the polls opened on November 2, 2004, overturned the rulings of
the district courts and opened the gates for private challengers at polling
places. This section examines the reasoning behind the majority and
concurring opinions and argues that these opinions are fundamentally
flawed. This section also discusses the dissenting opinion of Judge Cole
and advocates that the majority should have taken this stance.
The opinion of Judge Rogers began by refuting the plaintiffs’
argument that a more narrowly tailored approach was available. 147
Judge Roberts asserted that this claim was not likely to succeed on its
merits because the challengers could only initiate the inquiry process
and that precinct judges were responsible for carrying out the
challenge. 148 However, Judge Rogers failed to recognize that the
presence of precinct judges at polling places made the function
performed by private challengers unnecessary. These precinct judges
are appointed by the local elections boards, which have an interest in
preserving the integrity of the voting process. 149 Furthermore, while
precinct judges and other election officials have specific training and
detailed knowledge of election law, 150 the Appointment of Challengers
Statute allows any eligible voter to serve as a private challenger. 151 This
opinion ignored evidence presented to the district court in Spencer v.
Blackwell establishing that less than one-third of the registered
Republican challengers in Hamilton County attended the training session
for challengers that was held prior to Election Day. 152 Additionally,
while the memorandum written from Secretary of State Blackwell to
challengers stipulated that challenges must be made for “good cause,” it
offered no guidelines defining a good faith challenge. 153
The opinion went on to reason that employing this procedure may
cause longer lines at polling places resulting from delay and

147. Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell (Summit County II), 388
F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2004).
148. Id.
149. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3501.22 (West 2005). This statute stipulates the process a
county board of elections follow to appoint precinct judges.
150. See id. This statute requires elections board members to carefully examine the qualifications
of each potential precinct judge. Id.
151. See id. § 3505.21.
152. Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 532 (S.D. Ohio 2004). Drew Hicks, an attorney
and registered Republican challenger testified to the district court that approximately two hundred
people attended a training session held on October 31 for challengers. Id.
153. See id. at 531.
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confusion. 154 However, having to endure longer lines at the polls did
not amount to the type of severe burden that would require the procedure
be declared unconstitutional. 155
This rationalization fails to
acknowledge that the delay and confusion are byproducts of an
unnecessary procedure. As Judge Cole points out in his dissent, each
polling place is equipped with election officials and election judges to
challenge potential voter fraud. 156 Permitting private challengers to
contest voter eligibility at polls essentially allows unqualified people to
perform a function that can be executed by qualified people and creates
additional chaos without justification. Judge Rogers’ opinion was based
primarily on the state’s interest in not having to change its elections
rules at the last minute 157 rather than a careful analysis of the Voter
Challenger Statute and the manner in which the political parties planned
to implement the statute.
Judge Ryan, in his concurring opinion, based his decision on the
theory that the plaintiffs had no standing because their injury was not
“actual or imminent,” but rather “conjectural or hypothetical.” 158 He
stated that the Voter Challenger Statute had been on the books in Ohio
for decades and that the injury asserted by the plaintiffs had never
surfaced in previous elections. 159 Furthermore, he claimed that the
plaintiffs offered no evidence that the injury alleged by the plaintiffs
would occur on Election Day. 160 However, this statement ignores
evidence heard by the district court confirming that this would be the
first election where challengers would actually come to polling places
and participate in eligibility challenges. 161 Judge Ryan based his
decision on the fact that disorder and confusion have not occurred in
previous elections without acknowledging that the political parties had
never sent challengers to precincts in previous elections. For this reason
his opinion is fundamentally flawed.
Judge Cole began his dissenting opinion by acknowledging the

154. Summit County Democratic Cent. & Executive Comm. v. Blackwell (Summit County II), 388
F.3d 547, 551 (6th Cir. 2004).
155. Id.
156. Id. at 552 (Cole, J., dissenting).
157. Id. at 551 (majority opinion).
158. Id. at 551–52 (Ryan, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 552
160. Id.
161. See Spencer v. Blackwell, 347 F. Supp. 2d 528, 530 (S.D. Ohio 2004). Defendant Tim Burke
testified to the district court that Hamilton County Republican and Democratic parties had traditionally
filed a list of precinct executives to serve as challengers, but that those named challengers have not
actually come to the polling places or participated in eligibility challenges in the past. Id.
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historic magnitude of the case. 162 He noted that this election marked the
first since the civil rights era where political parties targeted voting
precincts with predominantly African-American voters to challenge their
qualifications. 163 He recognized his judicial role of balancing the right
to vote without undue burden against the state’s right to prevent voter
fraud, but asserted that where this balance is close, the courts must err
on the side of those exercising the franchise. 164 When weighing these
interests, Judge Cole found that the balance of harms was not even
close. 165 He argued the Voter Challenger Statute is not the least
restrictive means of advancing the state’s interest based on the presence
of election officials and election judges at polling places.166
Additionally, he maintained that the harm caused by chaos and
uncertainty far outweighed the slight decrease in voter fraud that would
result from implementation of the statute. 167
Judge Cole’s opinion was the only one among the panel to recognize
that casting a ballot is a fundamental right, and that federal case law
requires close scrutiny of any measures that restrain this right. 168 In
Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court established that equal protection of the
law applies to the manner in which a law is exercised and that a state
may not apply a law to value one person’s vote over another. 169 In cases
such as this, where the state gives authority to local election officials,
Bush v. Gore places a heightened burden on the state to ensure that the
laws are applied equally. 170 The Ohio Voter Challenger Statute, with its
broad and ambiguous language, vests the state’s duty of preventing voter
fraud in county elections boards and private individuals. Furthermore,
the law leaves the door open for private individuals and political groups
to focus its challenges upon a specific racial class. By allowing private
challengers to apply the law disparately across racial lines, the Voter
Challenger Statute does not provide Ohio citizens equal protection of the
law, and therefore is unconstitutional.

162. Summit County II, 388 F.3d at 552 (Cole, J., dissenting).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 554.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886);
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Harper v. Va. Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
169. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
170. Id.
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V. CONCLUSION
The Sixth Circuit ruling in Summit County II that stayed the
injunctions issued by the district courts opened the door for private
challengers on Election Day. However, despite the Sixth Circuit ruling,
very few challenges were made to voters. 171 Based on publicity from
these cases, the Republican Party instructed its challengers only to
witness the voting process, rather than make individual challenges. 172
Furthermore, media exposure from the Summit County and Spencer
cases resulted in increased participation among African-American
voters. 173 Plaintiff Donald Spencer believes that if the suit had not been
filed, Republicans would have been able to intimidate the AfricanAmerican community, resulting in a lack of representation at the
polls. 174
Despite the successful turnout of African-American voters and the
lack of intimidation from Republican challengers, the Ohio Voter
Challenger Statute violates federal law and is unconstitutional. This
regulation gives election judges discretion to deny any voter a ballot
despite the language of HAVA, which requires election officials to issue
provisional ballots to voters suspected to be ineligible. Furthermore,
allowing private challengers to contest the eligibility of voters at polling
places allows interest groups and political parties to target the eligibility
of certain classes of voters. By allowing these classes to be
disproportionately targeted, Ohio law does not ensure equal protection to
voters and violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution.

171. See Jordan Green, Challenging Jim Crow in Cincinnati, at http://www.counterpunch.org/
green11162004.html (Nov. 16, 2004).
172. Id. In an Election Day interview, Ohio Governor Bob Taft issued a statement that
Republican challengers would only be witnessing the process and reporting concerns to precinct
officials. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. On Election Day, Donald Spencer was quoted, “We are certain that if we had not filed
the suit, the Republicans might have been able to intimidate and cause a lack of representation in the
African American community. We think the big turnout we had in the election may have been caused
by the publicity this suit brought.” Id.
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